domingo, 6 de dezembro de 2009

CO2 is Not a Pollutant: Debunking a Global-Warming Myth

(Public Discourse: Ethics, Law and the Common Good - http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com)

In the wake of the “Climate-gate” controversy, a scientist at Princeton University argues for a sensible view on climate change and CO2.
I believe that the increase of carbon dioxide is not a cause for alarm and, in fact, will be good for mankind. Before I explain, let me state clearly where I probably agree with other writers on the climate issue. We have been in a period of global warming over the past 200 years, but there have been several periods, like the last ten years, when the warming has nearly ceased, and there have even been periods of moderate cooling, as from 1940 to 1970. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) have increased from about 280 to 380 parts per million (ppm) over the past century. The combustion of fossil fuels—coal, oil and natural gas—has contributed to the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere. And finally, increasing concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere will cause the earth’s surface to warm. The key question is: will the net effect of the warming, and any other effects of the CO2, be good or bad for humanity?
I predict that future historians will look back on this period much as we now view the period just before the passage of the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution to prohibit “the manufacturing, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors.” At the time, the 18th amendment seemed to be exactly the right thing to do—who wanted to be in league with demon rum? More than half the states enacted prohibition laws before the 18th amendment was ratified. Only one state, Rhode Island, voted against the 18th amendment. There were many thoughtful people, including a majority of Rhode Islanders, who thought that prohibition might do more harm than good. But they were completely outmatched by the temperance movement. Then as now, deeply sincere people thought they were saving humanity, be it from the evils of alcohol or CO2. Prohibition was a mistake, and our country has probably still not fully recovered from the damage it did. Institutions like organized crime got their start in that era. Current proposals to curb carbon emissions could lead to different but no less serious negative effects.
But what about the frightening consequences of increasing levels of CO2 that we keep hearing about? In a word, they are wildly exaggerated, just as the purported benefits of prohibition were wildly exaggerated. Let me turn now to the science and try to explain why I and many scientists like me are not alarmed by increasing levels of CO2.
The earth’s climate really is strongly affected by the greenhouse effect, although the physics is not the same as that which makes real, glassed-in greenhouses work. Without greenhouse warming, the earth would be much too cold to sustain its current abundance of life. However, the largest single contributor to the greenhouse effect is water vapor and clouds, which studies indicate are responsible for between 66% and 85% of the total effect. Carbon dioxide contributes a smaller amount, no more than 25%. There is little argument in the scientific community that a direct effect of doubling the CO2 concentration would produce a small increase in the earth’s temperature—on the order of one degree. Additional increments of CO2 will cause relatively less direct warming because we already have so much CO2 in the atmosphere that it has blocked most of the infrared radiation that it can. It is like putting an additional ski hat on your head when you already have a nice warm one below it, but you are only wearing a windbreaker. To really get warmer, you need to add a warmer jacket. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) thinks that this extra jacket is water vapor and clouds.
Since most of the greenhouse effect for the earth is due to water vapor and clouds, added CO2 must substantially increase water’s contribution to lead to the frightening scenarios that are bandied about. The buzz word here is that there is “positive feedback.” Some recent observations, however, have indicated that this positive feedback mechanism may not be as large as previously expected. The evidence here comes from satellite measurements of infrared radiation escaping from the earth into outer space, from measurements of sunlight reflected from clouds and from measurements of the temperature the earth’s surface or of the troposphere, the roughly 10 km thick layer of the atmosphere above the earth’s surface that is filled with churning air and clouds, heated from below at the earth’s surface, and cooled at the top by radiation into space.
But the climate is warming and CO2 is increasing. Doesn’t this prove that CO2 is causing global warming through the greenhouse effect? There have been similar warmings several times in the 10,000 years since the end of the last ice age. These earlier warmings clearly had nothing to do with the combustion of fossil fuels. The current warming may very well also be due mostly to natural causes, not to industrial activity.
There is much talk about the “pollutant CO2,” or about “poisoning the atmosphere” with CO2. We are told that we need to minimize our “carbon footprint.” But CO2 is not a pollutant and it is not a poison and we should not corrupt the English language by depriving “pollutant” and “poison” of their original meaning. Our exhaled breath contains about 4% CO2. That is 40,000 parts per million, or about 100 times the current atmospheric concentration. CO2 is absolutely essential for life on earth. Commercial greenhouse operators often use CO2 as a fertilizer to improve the health and growth rate of their plants. We try to keep CO2 levels in our US Navy submarines no higher than 8,000 parts per million, about 20 times current atmospheric levels. Few adverse effects are observed at even higher levels (while too much C02 is poisonous for animals, including humans, no one suggests that anthropogenic emissions could ever cause atmospheric levels to reach anywhere near the level of C02 that is directly toxic).
We are all aware that “the green revolution” has increased crop yields around the world. Part of this development is due to improved crop varieties and better use of mineral fertilizers and herbicides. But no small part of the yield improvement may have come from increased atmospheric levels of CO2. Plants photosynthesize more carbohydrates when they have more CO2. Plants are also more drought-tolerant with more CO2, because they need not “inhale” as much air to get the CO2 needed for photosynthesis. At the same time, the plants need not “exhale” as much water vapor when they are using air enriched in CO2. Plants decrease the number of stomata or air pores on their leaf surfaces in response to increasing atmospheric levels of CO2. They are adapted to changing CO2 levels and they prefer higher levels than those we have at present. If we really were to decrease our current level of CO2 of around 400 ppm to the 270 ppm that prevailed a few hundred years ago, we could lose some of the benefits of the green revolution. Crop yields may well continue to increase as CO2 levels go up, since we are far from the optimum levels for plant growth. Commercial greenhouse operators are advised to add enough CO2 to maintain about 1000 ppm around their plants. One possible conclusion that can be drawn from a recent study by Dr. Robert Mendelsohn at Yale University is that moderate warming may be an overall benefit to mankind in part because it could lead to higher agricultural yields.
In Voltaire’s Candide, Dr. Pangloss repeatedly assured young Candide that they were living in “the best of all possible worlds,” presumably also with the best of all CO2 concentrations. That we are (or were) living at the best of all CO2 concentrations seems to be a tacit assumption of the IPCC executive summaries for policy makers. Enormous effort and imagination have gone into showing that increasing concentrations of CO2 will be catastrophic. Alarmists have said that cities will be flooded by sea-level rises that are ten or more times bigger than even IPCC predicts, there will be mass extinctions of species, billions of people will die, tipping points will render the planet a desert. A few months ago I read that global warming will soon bring on a devastating epidemic of kidney stones. If you write down all the ills attributed to global warming you fill up a very thick book.
It is frequently asserted that there is a consensus behind the idea that there is an impending disaster from climate change, and that it may already be too late to avert this catastrophe, even if we stop burning fossil fuels now. We are told that only a few flat-earthers still have any doubt about the calamitous effects of continued CO2 emissions. There are a number of answers to this assertion. Indeed, we are not facing a crisis unless we create one for ourselves.
The sea level is indeed rising, just as it has for the past 20,000 years since the end of the last ice age. Fairly accurate measurements of sea level have been available since about 1800. These measurements show no evidence of any acceleration—in spite of the increased levels of CO2. The naturally rising sea level can be a serious local issue for heavily-populated, low-lying areas like New Orleans, where land subsidence compounds the problem. But to think that merely limiting CO2 emissions will stop sea level rise is a dangerous illusion. It is also possible that the warming seas around Antarctica will cause more snowfall over the continent and will counteract the sea-level rise. Indeed, recent observations suggest that exactly this effect is operative in certain parts of Antarctica where ice coverage has been increasing. In any case, the rising sea level is a problem that needs quick local action for locations like New Orleans rather than slow action globally.
It is regrettable that the climate-change issue has become confused with immediate and serious problems like secure energy supplies, protecting our environment, and figuring out where future generations will get energy supplies or chemical feedstocks after we have burned all the fossil fuel we can find. We should not confuse these laudable goals with hysterics about carbon footprints. For example, when weighing pluses and minuses of the continued or increased use of coal, our worry should not be increased atmospheric CO2, which may well be good for mankind. We should focus on real issues like damage to the land and waterways by strip mining, inadequate remediation, hazards to miners, the release of real pollutants and poisons like mercury, other heavy metals, organic carcinogens, etc. Much of the potential harm from coal mining can be eliminated, for example, by like strict requirements that strip-mined land be restored to a condition that is as least as good, and preferably better than when the mining began. Life is about making decisions and decisions are about trade-offs. We can choose to promote investment in technology that addresses real problems and scientific research that will let us cope with real problems more efficiently. Or we can act on unreasonable fears and suppress energy use, economic growth and the benefits that come from the creation of national wealth.
William Happer is the Cyrus Fogg Brackett Professor of Physics at Princeton University. From 1991 to 1993 he served as director of the Office of Energy Research in the U.S. Department of Energy.
This paper was adapted from testimony given before the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on February 25, 2009.

Copyright 2009 the Witherspoon Institute. All rights reserved.

sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009

Falso coma de Rom Houben não é caso isolado
Durante 23 anos ele pôde sentir e ouvir
“Eu gritava mas ninguém me escutava”, declarou Ron Houben, agora com 46 anos, à revista alemã Der Spiegel. O paciente, aficcionado por artes marciais e estudante de engenharia, passou 23 anos em um suposto estado de coma após um acidente de trânsito. Em 2006, Houben conseguiu novamente se comunicar, por meio de um teclado especial, graças a que o neurologista Steven Laureys, da Universidade de Lieja, descobrisse que os médicos tinham se equivocado em seu diagnóstico inicial. Sua história foi revelada esta semana através de um ensaio publicado na revista BioMedCentral Neurology.IncomunicávelPouco tempo depois do acidente, ocorrido em 1983, os médicos e enfermeiros que atenderam Houben na cidade de Zolder (Bélgica), asseguraram que não existia nenhuma esperança de que pudesse despertar do suposto coma.“Eu gritava sem que ninguém pudesse escutar”, assegurou Houben. “Fui testemunha do meu sofrimento enquanto meus médicos tentavam falar comigo, até o dia em que renunciaram”, indicou.O paciente assinalou que, ainda que permaneceu tanto tempo incomunicável, “agora quero ler, falar com meus amigos por meio do computador e aproveitar minha vida, agora as pessoas sabem que não estou morto”.Sua mãe, Fina Houben, que cuidou dele durante todos estes anos, assegurou que sempre acreditou que seu filho estava consciente. “Pequenas coisas me demonstravam isso. Quando eu lhe dizia que me olhasse, ele levantava um pouco a cabeça e me olhava um pouco. Dizia-lhe para virar a cabeça, e ele tentava”.Por sua parte, o neurologista Steven Laureys assinalou que cerca de 40% dos casos em que se diagnostica estado vegetal são equivocados e que um estudo mais exaustivo pode revelar neste percentual vários sinais de consciência.Laureys conta que com a nova tecnologia de “scanning”, os especialistas puderam demonstrar que a atividade cerebral do paciente não tinha sido interrompida. Logo utilizaram um instrumento de alta sensibilidade em que puderam registrar mínimos movimentos dos quais se valeram para “falar com Rom”, que pôde contar sua história.Dr. Laureys sustenta em seu informe que o termo “estado vegetal”, em grande parte dos casos, consiste em uma questão de “etiquetas que se colocam no paciente” e que podem marcar uma grande diferença entre a vida e a morte.O próprio Houben, ao se comunicar, indicou: “se uma pessoa em uma cama de hospital tem uma etiqueta em que diz “estado de mínima consciência” ou “estado vegetal”, dificilmente se poderia tirar”.Sobre este tema, o médico Fulvio De Nigris, diretor da casa de cuidados intensivos “Luca De Nigris”, em Bolonha, assinalou que tanto para ele como para seus colegas, este fato “não é uma novidade”, e que, ao contrário, pode reforçar “a esperança que os familiares têm de que qualquer coisa pode ocorrer”, disse à Rádio Vaticano.Nigris assegurou que o aspecto mais difícil e mais valente nestes casos é “olhar para estas pessoas com os olhos da sensibilidade, da sociabilidade e da democracia”.
Carmen Elena Villa (in zenit.org)

segunda-feira, 9 de novembro de 2009

The Financial Crisis and the Challenge of Natural Law







Is the current financial crisis simply a technical failure, or does it derive from some more basic problem? Economists may need to begin addressing fundamental questions concerned with value, and for that, they may turn to the natural law tradition.
One of the fallouts of the global financial crisis, especially in the wake of the Lehman collapse in September 2008, has been a questioning of the value of much economics, whether as delivered by the mathematical adepts of sophisticated financial modeling in the business world, or by academia. Both kinds of economics promised a rational world of ever-increasing happiness and stability. But now that tool box appears to be rather empty.
Many observers have commented that much conventional economics has failed empirically, in that it ignored themes such as financial instability or the possibility of multiple equilibria leading to sub-optimal outcomes. Such prominent figures as Paul Krugman have joined in the orgy of recrimination and castigation (though rarely self-castigation).There is no doubt about the extent of the empirical shortcomings, and that many prominent economists followed the maker of the rational choice revolution, Robert Lucas, in erroneously claiming that improved economics made financial crises an impossibility. Consequently, many people, including many economists, have complained that “economic theories failed just when we needed them most.”
As a result, the crisis has led to a battery of worrying policy initiatives. Will temporary surges in state spending to deal with the aftermath of banking crises lead to permanently higher levels of government spending and indebtedness? How can they be financed? Is there a danger of inflationary developments as a consequence of ballooning public sector deficits? Citizens should ask precisely what is worrying in the new policy initiatives: only with an articulation of that concern will it be possible to formulate legitimate policies. Often, complaints about the inadequacy of economics are linked to advocacy of some policy position in response to the crisis. Such policy positions are fiercely contested, and many of them appear linked to particular and powerful interests: banks and financial services, lawyers, automobile producers and automobile trade unions are all groups that have tried to assert that a general good depends on the subvention and rescue of their particular kind of activity.
Most recently, the issue of executive compensation has dominated national and international debates. What sorts of compensation level are appropriate, and how should these levels be determined? What criteria can be used in setting levels of compensation? Or is this an activity which the state should not be involved in at all, and which should be left as the outcome of market processes? The most divisive issue at the G-20 Pittsburgh meeting concerned precisely the appropriate response to the problem of remuneration in the financial sector. Most Americans are prepared to argue that high pay levels are not appropriate where losses mean that financial institutions need to be bailed out with public money. Some others argue that a distorted incentive system in the past led bankers to take inappropriate risks, and that consequently, for pragmatic reasons, the incentives should be better adjusted to mirror long-term performance (and also long-term social or general gains). By contrast, some European governments and thinkers suggested that excessive pay levels were in themselves wrong—regardless of whether they led to losses and inappropriate gains or not.
None of these controversies really address the causes of the perceived failure of conventional economics. The question remains whether this is simply a technical failure, or whether it derives from some more basic problem. Is there a more general failure because of an unwillingness among economists to discuss fundamental questions concerned with value?
What are the value of public goods such as currency stability? Why should we place a value on open markets? For what reasons should people have the opportunity of undertaking employment?
Sometimes discussions of such motivations revolve around concepts of natural rights: a right to employment, to a fair income, or to access to markets. What is the source of such rights, and how can conflicts of rights be arbitrated?
It is not surprising, then, that there is a new concern of some economists with justice and with ways of interpreting justice that do not necessarily involve the clash of two or more conflicting rights but rather as a way of developing potentials that are inherent in human beings. One interesting consequence of this new concern has been a revived interest in how different cultures have handled the problem of clashes of interest, as in Amartya Sen’s new book The Idea of Justice. Often the idea of precepts that can be derived from reason is traced back to Greek philosophy, especially to Aristotle, and especially as mediated in medieval philosophy in the writings of Averroes and Aquinas. But Sen has pointed out how Indian thinkers evolved a rather parallel discourse to that of Aristotle; Arthur Waldron has identified the same debate in China over two millennia ago.
It is reasonable to think that the crisis in empirical economics and the broader crisis in values are connected. This is where natural law thinking can be a powerful corrective. For in the natural law tradition, a body of guiding principles can be derived from the application of reason. But integrating the natural law tradition with contemporary economics may prove difficult.
One outstanding problem is that differing traditions of analysis have no way of speaking directly to each other. Moral philosophy is normative, while economics self-consciously avoids the creation of norms, and instead analyzes the relationships inherent in empirical data. The different approaches look as a consequence like endless parallel bars, inviting impossible intellectual and moral gymnastics between is and ought.
Both disciplines in consequence have their own very distinct version of a crisis. For moral philosophers, the world of the market does not behave as they hold it should, while economists have discovered that the market does not behave as they think it will.
There are also different views of the time framework for analysis, each of which presents its own peculiar problems. The concepts of justice are eternally valid, with the result that many will ask how they should adjust to a world which is constantly changing and generating new problems that require new analyses. By contrast, the problem of utility is that it may be a very short-term concept. Indeed, much of the literature on happiness has been devoted to showing that many forms of consumption generate only a short term surge in happiness without leading to a long-term increase in wellbeing. As a result, many argue that a truer measure of felicity would need to examine long-term contentment. Latin distinguishes very clearly between the short-term state of happiness (felix) and the longer-term state (beatus).
The most basic issue in the debate on the contribution of natural law thinking to economics is the question of the realization of human freedom. Over the past thirty years, a prominent theme of much analysis has been that political and economic freedom produce benefits, in particular gains in well-being. Sophisticated measures such as those provided annually by Freedom House are used to establish the empirical veracity (over fairly narrowly defined time periods) of this social-science claim. A parallel stream of thought tried to make the claim that religious practice was desirable and beneficial because—again as demonstrated empirically—it was associated with gains in income and wealth. The social-science analysis of religion in this kind of way goes back at least to Max Weber’s famous identification of the Protestant ethic with the “spirit of capitalism.”
The empirical argument for faith and freedom can be deeply distorted and quite destructive. Freedom has a value—or represents a truth—in itself. Religious values are not derived from their potential material benefits but from a transcendent order. Even though it may be true that faith and love represent a powerful tool in tackling poverty, they do that because of their intrinsic value as expressions of what is truly human. The greatest contribution that the natural law tradition provides is its powerful insistence on a hierarchy of value, in which value as such is recognized, rather than appearing as an instrumental tool for some other purpose.


Harold James is Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University. He is a Senior Fellow of the Witherspoon Institute, where he is also the Director of the Program in Ethics, Culture, and Economic Development. His most recent book is The Creation and Destruction of Value. He sits on the editorial board of Public Discourse.


Copyright 2009 the Witherspoon Institute. All rights reserved.
The Evolution of Divorce
W. BRADFORD WILCOX



In 1969, Governor Ronald Reagan of California made what he later admitted was one of the biggest mistakes of his political life. Seeking to eliminate the strife and deception often associated with the legal regime of fault-based divorce, Reagan signed the nation's first no-fault divorce bill. The new law eliminated the need for couples to fabricate spousal wrongdoing in pursuit of a divorce; indeed, one likely reason for Reagan's decision to sign the bill was that his first wife, Jane Wyman, had unfairly accused him of "mental cruelty" to obtain a divorce in 1948. But no-fault divorce also gutted marriage of its legal power to bind husband and wife, allowing one spouse to dissolve a marriage for any reason — or for no reason at all.
In the decade and a half that followed, virtually every state in the Union followed California's lead and enacted a no-fault divorce law of its own. This legal transformation was only one of the more visible signs of the divorce revolution then sweeping the United States: From 1960 to 1980, the divorce rate more than doubled — from 9.2 divorces per 1,000 married women to 22.6 divorces per 1,000 married women. This meant that while less than 20% of couples who married in 1950 ended up divorced, about 50% of couples who married in 1970 did. And approximately half of the children born to married parents in the 1970s saw their parents part, compared to only about 11% of those born in the 1950s.
In the years since 1980, however, these trends have not continued on straight upward paths, and the story of divorce has grown increasingly complicated. In the case of divorce, as in so many others, the worst consequences of the social revolution of the 1960s and '70s are now felt disproportionately by the poor and less educated, while the wealthy elites who set off these transformations in the first place have managed to reclaim somewhat healthier and more stable habits of married life. This imbalance leaves our cultural and political elites less well attuned to the magnitude of social dysfunction in much of American society, and leaves the most vulnerable Americans — especially children living in poor and working-class communities — even worse off than they would otherwise be.
THE RISE OF DIVORCE
The divorce revolution of the 1960s and '70s was over-determined. The nearly universal introduction of no-fault divorce helped to open the floodgates, especially because these laws facilitated unilateral divorce and lent moral legitimacy to the dissolution of marriages. The sexual revolution, too, fueled the marital tumult of the times: Spouses found it easier in the Swinging Seventies to find extramarital partners, and came to have higher, and often unrealistic, expectations of their marital relationships. Increases in women's employment as well as feminist consciousness-raising also did their part to drive up the divorce rate, as wives felt freer in the late '60s and '70s to leave marriages that were abusive or that they found unsatisfying.
The anti-institutional tenor of the age also meant that churches lost much of their moral authority to reinforce the marital vow. It didn't help that many mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders were caught up in the zeitgeist, and lent explicit or implicit support to the divorce revolution sweeping across American society. This accomodationist mentality was evident in a 1976 pronouncement issued by the United Methodist Church, the largest mainline Protestant denomination in America. The statement read in part:
In marriages where the partners are, even after thoughtful reconsideration and counsel, estranged beyond reconciliation, we recognize divorce and the right of divorced persons to remarry, and express our concern for the needs of the children of such unions. To this end we encourage an active, accepting, and enabling commitment of the Church and our society to minister to the needs of divorced persons.
Most important, the psychological revolution of the late '60s and '70s, which was itself fueled by a post-war prosperity that allowed people to give greater attention to non-material concerns, played a key role in reconfiguring men and women's views of marriage and family life. Prior to the late 1960s, Americans were more likely to look at marriage and family through the prisms of duty, obligation, and sacrifice. A successful, happy home was one in which intimacy was an important good, but by no means the only one in view. A decent job, a well-maintained home, mutual spousal aid, child-rearing, and shared religious faith were seen almost universally as the goods that marriage and family life were intended to advance.
But the psychological revolution's focus on individual fulfillment and personal growth changed all that. Increasingly, marriage was seen as a vehicle for a self-oriented ethic of romance, intimacy, and fulfillment. In this new psychological approach to married life, one's primary obligation was not to one's family but to one's self; hence, marital success was defined not by successfully meeting obligations to one's spouse and children but by a strong sense of subjective happiness in marriage — usually to be found in and through an intense, emotional relationship with one's spouse. The 1970s marked the period when, for many Americans, a more institutional model of marriage gave way to the "soul-mate model" of marriage.
Of course, the soul-mate model was much more likely to lead couples to divorce court than was the earlier institutional model of marriage. Now, those who felt they were in unfulfilling marriages also felt obligated to divorce in order to honor the newly widespread ethic of expressive individualism. As social historian Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has observed of this period, "divorce was not only an individual right but also a psychological resource. The dissolution of marriage offered the chance to make oneself over from the inside out, to refurbish and express the inner self, and to acquire certain valuable psychological assets and competencies, such as initiative, assertiveness, and a stronger and better self-image."
But what about the children? In the older, institutional model of marriage, parents were supposed to stick together for their sake. The view was that divorce could leave an indelible emotional scar on children, and would also harm their social and economic future. Yet under the new soul-mate model of marriage, divorce could be an opportunity for growth not only for adults but also for their offspring. The view was that divorce could protect the emotional welfare of children by allowing their parents to leave marriages in which they felt unhappy. In 1962, as Whitehead points out in her book The Divorce Culture, about half of American women agreed with the idea that "when there are children in the family parents should stay together even if they don't get along." By 1977, only 20% of American women held this view.
At the height of the divorce revolution in the 1970s, many scholars, therapists, and journalists served as enablers of this kind of thinking. These elites argued that children were resilient in the face of divorce; that children could easily find male role models to replace absent fathers; and that children would be happier if their parents were able to leave unhappy marriages. In 1979, one prominent scholar wrote in the Journal of Divorce that divorce even held "growth potential" for mothers, as they could enjoy "increased personal autonomy, a new sense of competence and control, [and the] development of better relationships with [their] children." And in 1974's The Courage to Divorce, social workers Susan Gettleman and Janet Markowitz argued that boys need not be harmed by the absence of their fathers: "When fathers are not available, friends, relatives, teachers and counselors can provide ample opportunity for youngsters to model themselves after a like-sexed adult."
Thus, by the time the 1970s came to a close, many Americans — rich and poor alike — had jettisoned the institutional model of married life that prioritized the welfare of children, and which sought to discourage divorce in all but the most dire of circumstances. Instead, they embraced the soul-mate model of married life, which prioritized the emotional welfare of adults and gave moral permission to divorce for virtually any reason.
THE MORNING AFTER
Thirty years later, the myth of the good divorce has not stood up well in the face of sustained social scientific inquiry — especially when one considers the welfare of children exposed to their parents' divorces.
Since 1974, about 1 million children per year have seen their parents divorce — and children who are exposed to divorce are two to three times more likely than their peers in intact marriages to suffer from serious social or psychological pathologies. In their book Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps, sociologists Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur found that 31% of adolescents with divorced parents dropped out of high school, compared to 13% of children from intact families. They also concluded that 33% of adolescent girls whose parents divorced became teen mothers, compared to 11% of girls from continuously married families. And McLanahan and her colleagues have found that 11% of boys who come from divorced families end up spending time in prison before the age of 32, compared to 5% of boys who come from intact homes.
Research also indicates that remarriage is no salve for children wounded by divorce. Indeed, as sociologist Andrew Cherlin notes in his important new book, The Marriage-Go-Round, "children whose parents have remarried do not have higher levels of well-being than children in lone-parent families." The reason? Often, the establishment of a step-family results in yet another move for a child, requiring adjustment to a new caretaker and new step-siblings — all of which can be difficult for children, who tend to thrive on stability.
The divorce revolution's collective consequences for children are striking. Taking into account both divorce and non-marital childbearing, sociologist Paul Amato estimates that if the United States enjoyed the same level of family stability today as it did in 1960, the nation would have 750,000 fewer children repeating grades, 1.2 million fewer school suspensions, approximately 500,000 fewer acts of teenage delinquency, about 600,000 fewer kids receiving therapy, and approximately 70,000 fewer suicide attempts every year (correction appended). As Amato concludes, turning back the family-­stability clock just a few decades could significantly improve the lives of many children.
Skeptics confronted with this kind of research often argue that it is unfair to compare children of divorce to children from intact, married households. They contend that it is the conflict that precedes the divorce, rather than the divorce itself, that is likely to be particularly traumatic for children. Amato's work suggests that the skeptics have a point: In cases where children are exposed to high levels of conflict — like domestic violence or screaming matches between parents — they do seem to do better if their parents part.
But more than two-thirds of all parental divorces do not involve such highly conflicted marriages. And "unfortunately, these are the very divorces that are most likely to be stressful for children," as Amato and Alan Booth, his colleague at Penn State University, point out. When children see their parents divorce because they have simply drifted apart — or because one or both parents have become unhappy or left to pursue another ­partner — the kids' faith in love, commitment, and marriage is often shattered. In the wake of their parents' divorce, children are also likely to experience a family move, marked declines in their family income, a stressed-out single mother, and substantial periods of paternal absence — all factors that put them at risk. In other words, the clear majority of divorces involving children in America are not in the best interests of the children.
Not surprisingly, the effects of divorce on adults are more ambiguous. From an emotional and social perspective, about 20% of divorced adults find their lives enhanced and another 50% seem to suffer no long-term ill effects, according to research by psychologist Mavis Hetherington. Adults who initiated a divorce are especially likely to report that they are flourishing afterward, or are at least doing just fine.
Spouses who were unwilling parties to a unilateral divorce, however, tend to do less well. And the ill effects of divorce for adults tend to fall disproportionately on the shoulders of fathers. Since approximately two-thirds of divorces are legally initiated by women, men are more likely than women to be divorced against their will. In many cases, these men have not engaged in egregious marital misconduct such as abuse, adultery, or substance abuse. They feel mistreated by their ex-wives and by state courts that no longer take into account marital "fault" when making determinations about child custody, child support, and the division of marital property. Yet in the wake of a divorce, these men will nevertheless often lose their homes, a substantial share of their monthly incomes, and regular contact with their children. For these men, and for women caught in similar circumstances, the sting of an unjust divorce can lead to downward emotional spirals, difficulties at work, and serious deteriorations in the quality of their relationships with their children.
Looking beyond the direct effects of divorce on adults and children, it is also important to note the ways in which widespread divorce has eroded the institution of marriage — particularly, its assault on the quality, prevalence, and stability of marriage in American life.
In the 1970s, proponents of easy divorce argued that the ready availability of divorce would boost the quality of married life, as abused, unfulfilled, or otherwise unhappy spouses were allowed to leave their marriages. Had they been correct, we would expect to see that Americans' reports of marital quality had improved during and after the 1970s. Instead, marital quality fell during the '70s and early '80s. In the early 1970s, 70% of married men and 67% of married women reported being very happy in their marriages; by the early '80s, these figures had fallen to 63% for men and 62% for women. So marital quality dropped even as divorce rates were reaching record highs.
What happened? It appears that average marriages suffered during this time, as widespread divorce undermined ordinary couples' faith in marital permanency and their ability to invest financially and emotionally in their marriages — ultimately casting clouds of doubt over their relationships. For instance, one study by economist Betsey Stevenson found that investments in marital partnerships declined in the wake of no-fault divorce laws. Specifically, she found that newlywed couples in states that passed no-fault divorce were about 10% less likely to support a spouse through college or graduate school and were 6% less likely to have a child together. Ironically, then, the widespread availability of easy divorce not only enabled "bad" marriages to be weeded out, but also made it more difficult for "good" marriages to take root and flourish.
Second, marriage rates have fallen and cohabitation rates have surged in the wake of the divorce revolution, as men and women's faith in marriage has been shaken. From 1960 to 2007, the percentage of American women who were married fell from 66% to 51%, and the percentage of men who were married fell from 69% to 55%. Yet at the same time, the number of cohabiting couples increased fourteen-fold — from 439,000 to more than 6.4 million. Because of these increases in cohabitation, about 40% of American children will spend some time in a cohabiting union; 20% of babies are now born to cohabiting couples. And because cohabiting unions are much less stable than marriages, the vast majority of the children born to cohabiting couples will see their parents break up by the time they turn 15.
A recent Bowling Green State University study of the motives for cohabitation found that young men and women who choose to cohabit are seeking alternatives to marriage and ways of testing a relationship to see if it might be safely transformed into a marriage — with both rationales clearly shaped by a fear of divorce. One young man told the researchers that living together allows you to "get to know the person and their habits before you get married. So that way, you won't have to get divorced." Another said that an advantage of cohabitation is that you "don't have to go through the divorce process if you do want to break up, you don't have to pay lawyers and have to deal with splitting everything and all that jazz."
My own research confirms the connection between divorce and cohabitation in America. Specifically, data from the General Social Survey indicate that adult children of divorce are 61% more likely than adult children from married families to endorse the notion that it is a "good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first." Likewise, adult children of divorce are 47% more likely to be currently cohabiting, compared to those who were raised in intact, married families. Thus divorce has played a key role in reducing marriage and increasing cohabitation, which now exists as a viable competitor to marriage in the organization of sex, intimacy, childbearing, and even child-rearing.
Third, the divorce revolution has contributed to an intergenerational cycle of divorce. Work by demographer Nicholas Wolfinger indicates that the adult children of divorce are now 89% more likely to divorce themselves, compared to adults who were raised in intact, married families. Children of divorce who marry other children of divorce are especially likely to end up divorced, according to Wolfinger's work. Of course, the reason children of divorce — especially children of low-conflict divorce — are more likely to end their marriages is precisely that they have often learned all the wrong lessons about trust, commitment, mutual sacrifice, and fidelity from their parents.
THE DIVORCE DIVIDE
Clearly, the divorce revolution of the 1960s and '70s left a poisonous legacy. But what has happened since? Where do we stand today on the question of marriage and divorce? A survey of the landscape presents a decidedly mixed portrait of contemporary married life in America.
The good news is that, on the whole, divorce has declined since 1980 and marital happiness has largely stabilized. The divorce rate fell from a historic high of 22.6 divorces per 1,000 married women in 1980 to 17.5 in 2007. In real terms, this means that slightly more than 40% of contemporary first marriages are likely to end in divorce, down from approximately 50% in 1980. Perhaps even more important, recent declines in divorce suggest that a clear majority of children who are now born to married couples will grow up with their married mothers and fathers.
Similarly, the decline in marital happiness associated with the tidal wave of divorce in the 1960s and '70s essentially stopped more than two decades ago. Men's marital happiness hovered around 63% from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s, while women's marital happiness fell just a bit, from 62% in the early 1980s to 60% in the mid-2000s.
This good news can be explained largely by three key factors. First, the age at first marriage has risen. In 1970, the median age of marriage was 20.8 for women and 23.2 for men; in 2007, it was 25.6 for women and 27.5 for men. This means that fewer Americans are marrying when they are too immature to forge successful marriages. (It is true that some of the increase in age at first marriage is linked to cohabitation, but not the bulk of it.)
Second, the views of academic and professional experts about divorce and family breakdown have changed significantly in recent decades. Social-science data about the consequences of divorce have moved many scholars across the political spectrum to warn against continuing the divorce revolution, and to argue that intact families are essential, especially to the well-being of children. Here is a characteristic example, from a recent publication by a group of scholars at the Brookings Institution and Princeton University:
Marriage provides benefits both to children and to society. Although it was once possible to believe that the nation's high rates of divorce, cohabitation, and nonmarital childbearing represented little more than lifestyle alternatives brought about by the freedom to pursue individual self-fulfillment, many analysts now believe that these individual choices can be damaging to the children who have no say in them and to the society that enables them.
Although certainly not all scholars, therapists, policymakers, and journalists would agree that contemporary levels of divorce and family breakdown are cause for worry, a much larger share of them expresses concern about the health of marriage in America — and about America's high level of divorce — than did so in the 1970s. These views seep into the popular consciousness and influence behavior — just as they did in the 1960s and '70s, when academic and professional experts carried the banner of the divorce revolution.
A third reason for the stabilization in divorce rates and marital happiness is not so heartening. Put simply, marriage is increasingly the preserve of the highly educated and the middle and upper classes. Fewer working-class and poor Americans are marrying nowadays in part because marriage is seen increasingly as a sort of status symbol: a sign that a couple has arrived both emotionally and financially, or is at least within range of the American Dream. This means that those who do marry today are more likely to start out enjoying the money, education, job security, and social skills that increase the probability of long-term marital success.
And this is where the bad news comes in. When it comes to divorce and marriage, America is increasingly divided along class and educational lines. Even as divorce in general has declined since the 1970s, what sociologist Steven Martin calls a "divorce divide" has also been growing between those with college degrees and those without (a distinction that also often translates to differences in income). The figures are quite striking: College-educated Americans have seen their divorce rates drop by about 30% since the early 1980s, whereas Americans without college degrees have seen their divorce rates increase by about 6%. Just under a quarter of college-educated couples who married in the early 1970s divorced in their first ten years of marriage, compared to 34% of their less-educated peers. Twenty years later, only 17% of college-­educated couples who married in the early 1990s divorced in their first ten years of marriage; 36% of less-educated couples who married in the early 1990s, however, divorced sometime in their first decade of marriage.
This growing divorce divide means that college-educated married couples are now about half as likely to divorce as their less-educated peers. Well-educated spouses who come from intact families, who enjoy annual incomes over $60,000, and who conceive their first child in ­wedlock — as many college-educated couples do — have exceedingly low rates of divorce.
Similar trends can be observed in measures of marital quality. For instance, if we look at married couples aged 18-60, 72% of spouses who were both college-educated and 65% of spouses who were both less-educated reported that they were "very happy" in their marriages in the 1970s, according to the General Social Survey. In the 2000s, marital happiness remained high among college-educated spouses, as 70% continued to report that they were "very happy" in their marriages. But marital happiness fell among less-educated spouses: Only 56% reported that they were "very happy" in their marriages in the 2000s.

These trends are mirrored in American illegitimacy statistics. Although one would never guess as much from the regular New York Times features on successful single women having children, non-marital childbearing is quite rare among college-educated women. According to a 2007 Child Trends study, only 7% of mothers with a college degree had a child outside of marriage, compared to more than 50% of mothers who had not gone to college.
So why are marriage and traditional child-rearing making a modest comeback in the upper reaches of society while they continue to unravel among those with less money and less education? Both cultural and economic forces are at work, each helping to widen the divorce and marriage divide in America.
First, while it was once the case that working-class and poor Americans held more conservative views of divorce than their middle- and upper-class peers, this is no longer so. For instance, a 2004 National Fatherhood Initiative poll of American adults aged 18-60 found that 52% of college-­educated Americans endorsed the norm that in the "absence of violence and extreme conflict, parents who have an unsatisfactory marriage should stay together until their children are grown." But only 35% of less-educated Americans surveyed endorsed the same viewpoint.
Likewise, according to my analysis of the General Social Survey, in the 1970s only 36% of college-educated Americans thought divorce should be "more difficult to obtain than it is now," compared to 46% of less-educated Americans. By the 2000s, 49% of college-educated Americans thought divorce laws should be tightened, compared to 48% of less-­educated ­Americans. Views of marriage have been growing more conservative among elites, but not among the poor and the less educated.
Second, the changing cultural meaning of marriage has also made it less necessary and less attractive to working-class and poor Americans. Prior to the 1960s, when the older, institutional model of marriage dominated popular consciousness, marriage was the only legitimate venue for having sex, bearing and raising children, and enjoying an intimate relationship. Moreover, Americans generally saw marriage as an institution that was about many more goods than a high-quality emotional relationship. Therefore, it made sense for all men and women — regardless of socioeconomic status — to get and stay married.
Yet now that the institutional model has lost its hold over the lives of American adults, sex, children, and intimacy can be had outside of ­marriage. All that remains unique to marriage today is the prospect of that high-quality emotional bond — the soul-mate model. As a result, marriage is now disproportionately appealing to wealthier, better-­educated couples, because less-educated, less-wealthy couples often do not have the emotional, social, and financial resources to enjoy a high-quality soul-mate marriage.
The qualitative research of sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas, for instance, shows that lower-income couples are much more likely to struggle with conflict, infidelity, and substance abuse than their higher-income peers, especially as the economic position of working-class men has grown more precarious since the 1970s. Because of shifts away from industrial employment and toward service occupations, real wages and employment rates have dropped markedly for working-class men, but not for college-educated men. For instance, from 1973 to 2007, real wages of men with a college degree rose 18%; by contrast, the wages of high-school-educated men fell 11%. Likewise, in 1970, 96% of men aged 25-64 with high-school degrees or with college degrees were employed. By 2003, employment had fallen only to 93% for college-­educated men of working age. But for working-aged men with only high-school degrees, labor-force participation had fallen to 84%, according to research by economist Francine Blau. These trends indicate that less-educated men have, in economic terms, become much less attractive as providers for their female peers than have college-educated men.
In other words, the soul-mate model of marriage does not extend equal marital opportunities. It therefore makes sense that fewer poor Americans would take on the responsibilities of modern married life, knowing that they are unlikely to reap its rewards.
The emergence of the divorce and marriage divide in America exacerbates a host of other social problems. The breakdown of marriage in ­working-class and poor communities has played a major role in fueling poverty and inequality, for instance. Isabel Sawhill at the Brookings Institution has concluded that virtually all of the increase in child poverty in the United States since the 1970s can be attributed to family breakdown. Meanwhile, the dissolution of marriage in working-class and poor communities has also fueled the growth of government, as federal, state, and local governments spend more money on police, prisons, welfare, and court costs, trying to pick up the pieces of broken families. Economist Ben Scafidi recently found that the public costs of family breakdown exceed $112 billion a year.
Moreover, children in single-parent homes are more likely to be exposed to Hollywood's warped vision of sex, relationships, and family life. For instance, a study by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that children in single-parent homes devote almost 45 minutes more per day to watching television than children in two-parent homes. Given the distorted nature of the popular culture's family-related messages, and the unorthodox family relationships of celebrity role models, this means that children in single-parent families are even less likely to develop a healthy understanding of marriage and family life — and are therefore less likely to have a positive vision of their own marital future.
Thus, the fallout of America's retreat from marriage has hit poor and working-class communities especially hard, with children on the lower end of the economic spectrum doubly disadvantaged by the material and marital circumstances of their parents.
STRENGHTENING MARRIAGE
There are no magic cures for the growing divorce divide in America. But a few modest policy measures could offer some much-needed help.
First, the states should reform their divorce laws. A return to fault-based divorce is almost certainly out of the question as a political matter, but some plausible common-sense reforms could nonetheless inject a measure of sanity into our nation's divorce laws. States should combine a one-year waiting period for married parents seeking a divorce with programs that educate those parents about the likely social and emotional consequences of their actions for their children. State divorce laws should also allow courts to factor in spousal conduct when making decisions about alimony, child support, custody, and property division. In particular, spouses who are being divorced against their will, and who have not engaged in egregious misbehavior such as abuse, adultery, or abandonment, should be given preferential treatment by family courts. Such consideration would add a measure of justice to the current divorce process; it would also discourage some divorces, as spouses who would otherwise seek an easy exit might avoid a divorce that would harm them financially or limit their access to their children.
Second, Congress should extend the federal Healthy Marriage Initiative. In 2006, as part of President George W. Bush's marriage initiative, Congress passed legislation allocating $100 million a year for five years to more than 100 programs designed to strengthen marriage and ­family ­relationships in America — especially among low-income couples. As Kathryn Edin of Harvard has noted, many of these programs are equipping poor and working-class couples with the relational skills that their better-educated peers rely upon to sustain their marriages. In the next year or two, many of these programs will be evaluated; the most successful programs serving poor and working-class communities should receive additional funding, and should be used as models for new programs to serve these communities. New ideas — like additional social-marketing campaigns on behalf of marriage, on the model of those undertaken to discourage smoking — should also be explored through the initiative.
Third, the federal government should expand the child tax credit. Raising children is expensive, and has become increasingly so, given rising college and health-care costs. Yet the real value of federal tax deductions for children has fallen considerably since the 1960s. To remedy this state of affairs, Ramesh Ponnuru and Robert Stein have proposed expanding the current child tax credit from $1,000 to $5,000 and making it fully refundable against both income and payroll taxes. A reform along those lines would provide a significant measure of financial relief to working-class and middle-class families, and would likely strengthen their increasingly fragile marriages.
Of course, none of these reforms of law and policy alone is likely to exercise a transformative influence on the quality and stability of marriage in America. Such fixes must be accompanied by changes in the wider culture. Parents, churches, schools, public officials, and the entertainment industry will have to do a better job of stressing the merits of a more institutional model of marriage. This will be particularly important for poor and working-class young adults, who are drifting away from marriage the fastest.
This is a tall order, to say the least. But if our society is genuinely interested in protecting and improving the welfare of children — especially children in our nation's most vulnerable communities — we must strengthen marriage and reduce the incidence of divorce in America. The unthinkable alternative is a nation divided more and more by class and marital ­status, and children doubly disadvantaged by poverty and single parenthood. Surely no one believes that such a state of affairs is in the national interest.



Correction appended: Paul Amato estimates that, if the United States enjoyed the same level of family stability today as it did in 1960, the United States would have approximately 70,000 fewer suicide attempts every year, not 70,000 fewer suicides, as was originally stated in this article.

sexta-feira, 6 de novembro de 2009

Shared Responsibilities

by ARCHBISHOP J. MICHAEL MILLER, CSB



The Church's clear teaching, constantly reiterated by the Holy See, affirms that parents are the first educators of their children.



Shared Responsibilities

Parental Rights and Subsidiarity


Parents have the original, primary, and inalienable right to educate their offspring in conformity with the family's moral and religious convictions. They are educators because they are parents. At the same time, the vast majority of parents share their educational responsibilities with other individuals and institutions, primarily the school.
Elementary education is, then, "an extension of parental education; it is extended and cooperative home schooling." In a true sense schools are extensions of the home. Parents -- and not schools either of the state or the Church -- have the primary moral responsibility of educating children to adulthood. Like a good Mother, the Church offers help to families by establishing Catholic schools that ensure the integral formation of their children.
In keeping with a basic tenet of Catholic social doctrine, the principle of subsidiarity must always govern relations among families, the Church, and the state. As Pope John Paul II wrote in his 1994 Letter to Families:
Subsidiarity thus complements paternal and maternal love and confirms its fundamental nature, inasmuch as all other participants in the process of education are only able to carry out their responsibilities in the name of the parents, with their consent, and, to a certain degree, with their authorization.
For subsidiarity to be effective, families must enjoy true liberty in deciding how their children are to be educated. This means that "in principle, a state monopoly of education is not permissible, and that only a pluralism of school systems will respect the fundamental right and the freedom of individuals -- although the exercise of this right may be conditioned by a multiplicity of factors, according to the social realities of each country." Thus, the Catholic Church upholds "the principle of a plurality of school systems in order to safeguard her objectives."
Right to Government Financial Assistance
A pressing problem for Catholic schools in the United States is the lack of government financial assistance. The Church's teaching authority has frequently addressed the rights of parents to such help in fulfilling their obligation to educate their children. At Vatican II, the Fathers declared that "the public power, which has the obligation to protect and defend the rights of citizens, must see to it, in its concern for distributive justice, that public subsidies are paid out in such a way that parents are truly free to choose according to their conscience the schools they want for their children."
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2005) states laconically that "the refusal to provide public economic support to non-public schools that need assistance and that render a service to civil society is to be considered an injustice." Furthermore, the state is obliged to provide such public subsidies because of the enormous contribution that Catholic schools make to society by serving the common good.
Most countries with substantial Christian majorities accept this obligation in justice: Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Scotland, to name a few. Their governments give Catholic schools financial assistance, some up to 100 percent. Italy, Mexico, China, Cuba, North Korea, and the United States are exceptions in withholding assistance.
For many families, especially those in the working and middle classes, the financial burden of providing Catholic education for their children is sizeable and often too great. Since 1990, the average tuition in elementary and secondary Catholic schools has more than doubled. In 2004, it stood at $2,432 for elementary schools and $5,870 for secondary schools.
As the American bishops recently stated, there is no other way to address this question of cost than "to advocate for parental school choice and personal and corporate tax credits." To advocate for some kind of government funding for Catholic education, as long as no unacceptable strings are attached, is the responsibility not just of parents of school-age children, but of all Catholics in their pursuit of justice. Too often Catholic Americans fail to appreciate that they have a right to subsidies for their schools because these institutions provide a service to society. In no way would such assistance compromise the constitutional separation of Church and state. Rather, it guarantees the fundamental right of parents to choose a school for their children.
Where the government bears its fair share of the financial burden, Catholic schools can flourish. Take the example of Melbourne, Australia. Melbourne is about the size of Houston; both cities have about four million inhabitants and more than one million Catholics. To serve its Catholic children, Melbourne has 256 elementary schools in its archdiocese and sixty-five secondary schools, compared with the Houston Archdiocese's fifty-two elementary and nine high schools. Why the difference? No doubt the answer lies in the generous public funding made available to Melbourne's Catholic schools.
Without some kind of government assistance or at least tax relief, it is difficult to see how Catholic education can remain affordable and accessible, especially to the increasing numbers of immigrant children, primarily Hispanics. Within less than a generation, Hispanics will constitute more than 50 percent of American Catholics and an even higher proportion of our Catholic children.
All Catholic children, not just those whose families have the financial means, have a right to a Catholic education. Vatican documents stress that the Church's preferential option for the poor means that she offers her educational ministry in the first place to "those who are poor in the goods of this world." The Holy See supports the concern of the American bishops to provide for the poor and those who might be underprepared for high academic achievement: the Catholic school "is a school for all, with special attention to those who are weakest." Guaranteeing this "for all" will require a new politics of educational funding in the United States.

quinta-feira, 5 de novembro de 2009

Gay Marriage, Democracy, and the Courts


The culture war will never end if judges invalidate the choices of voters.


By Robert P. George (in Wall Street Journal)

We are in the midst of a showdown over the legal definition of marriage. Though some state courts have interfered, the battle is mainly being fought in referenda around the country, where “same-sex marriage” has uniformly been rejected, and in legislatures, where some states have adopted it. It’s a raucous battle, but democracy is working.
Now the fight may head to the U.S. Supreme Court. Following California’s Proposition 8, which restored the historic definition of marriage in that state as the union of husband and wife, a federal lawsuit has been filed to invalidate traditional marriage laws.
It would be disastrous for the justices to do so. They would repeat the error in Roe v. Wade: namely, trying to remove a morally charged policy issue from the forums of democratic deliberation and resolve it according to their personal lights.
Even many supporters of legal abortion now consider Roe a mistake. Lacking any basis in the text, logic or original understanding of the Constitution, the decision became a symbol of the judicial usurpation of authority vested in the people and their representatives. It sent the message that judges need not be impartial umpires—as both John Roberts and Sonia Sotomayor say they should be—but that judges can impose their policy preferences under the pretext of enforcing constitutional guarantees.
By short-circuiting the democratic process, Roe inflamed the culture war that has divided our nation and polarized our politics. Abortion, which the Court purported to settle in 1973, remains the most unsettled issue in American politics—and the most unsettling. Another Roe would deepen the culture war and prolong it indefinitely.
View Full ImageDavid Klein

Some insist that the Supreme Court must invalidate traditional marriage laws because “rights” are at stake. But as in Roe, they are forced to peddle a strained and contentious reading of the Constitution—one whose dubiousness would undermine any ruling’s legitimacy.
Lawyers challenging traditional marriage laws liken their cause to Loving v. Virginia (which invalidated laws against interracial marriages), insinuating that conjugal-marriage supporters are bigots. This is ludicrous and offensive, and no one should hesitate to say so.
The definition of marriage was not at stake in Loving. Everyone agreed that interracial marriages were marriages. Racists just wanted to ban them as part of the evil regime of white supremacy that the equal protection clause was designed to destroy.
Opponents of racist laws in Loving did not question the idea, deeply embodied in our law and its shaping philosophical tradition, of marriage as a union that takes its distinctive character from being founded, unlike other friendships, on bodily unity of the kind that sometimes generates new life. This unity is why marriage, in our legal tradition, is consummated only by acts that are generative in kind. Such acts unite husband and wife at the most fundamental level and thus legally consummate marriage whether or not they are generative in effect, and even when conception is not sought.
Of course, marital intercourse often does produce babies, and marriage is the form of relationship that is uniquely apt for childrearing (which is why, unlike baptisms and bar mitzvahs, it is a matter of vital public concern). But as a comprehensive sharing of life—an emotional and biological union—marriage has value in itself and not merely as a means to procreation. This explains why our law has historically permitted annulment of marriage for non-consummation, but not for infertility; and why acts of sodomy, even between legally wed spouses, have never been recognized as consummating marriages.
Only this understanding makes sense of all the norms—annulability for non-consummation, the pledge of permanence, monogamy, sexual exclusivity—that shape marriage as we know it and that our law reflects. And only this view can explain why the state should regulate marriage (as opposed to ordinary friendships) at all—to make it more likely that, wherever possible, children are reared in the context of the bond between the parents whose sexual union gave them life.
If marriage is redefined, its connection to organic bodily union—and thus to procreation—will be undermined. It will increasingly be understood as an emotional union for the sake of adult satisfaction that is served by mutually agreeable sexual play. But there is no reason that primarily emotional unions like friendships should be permanent, exclusive, limited to two, or legally regulated at all. Thus, there will remain no principled basis for upholding marital norms like monogamy.
A veneer of sentiment may prevent these norms from collapsing—but only temporarily. The marriage culture, already wounded by widespread divorce, nonmarital cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing will fare no better than it has in those European societies that were in the vanguard of sexual “enlightenment.” And the primary victims of a weakened marriage culture are always children and those in the poorest, most vulnerable sectors of society.
Candid and clear-thinking advocates of redefining marriage recognize that doing so entails abandoning norms such as monogamy. In a 2006 statement entitled “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage,” over 300 lesbian, gay, and allied activists, educators, lawyers, and community organizers—including Gloria Steinem, Barbara Ehrenreich, and prominent Yale, Columbia and Georgetown professors—call for legally recognizing multiple sex partner (“polyamorous”) relationships. Their logic is unassailable once the historic definition of marriage is overthrown.
Is this a red herring? This week’s Newsweek reports more than 500,000 polyamorous households in the U.S.
So, before judging whether traditional marriage laws should be junked, we must decide what marriage is. It is this crucial and logically prior question that some want to shuffle off stage.
Because marriage has already been deeply wounded, some say that redefining it will do no additional harm. I disagree. We should strengthen, not redefine, marriage. But whatever one’s view, surely it is the people, not the courts, who should debate and decide. For reasons of both principle and prudence, the issue should be settled by democratic means, not by what Justice Byron White, in his dissent in Roe, called an “act of raw judicial power.”


Mr. George is professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University and founder of the American Principles Project (www.americanprinciplesproject.org).

sexta-feira, 30 de outubro de 2009

Pois é, já há muito tempo que só se transmite folclore transmontano


José Pacheco Pereira


Público, 20091024



A questão da "asfixia democrática" é das mais incómodas para o PS e para os próceres do pensamento único



Um notável anúncio do Euromilhões diz-nos que "este canal acaba de ser comprado pelo senhor Nuno Cabral de Montalegre e a partir de agora transmitirá apenas folclore transmontano". Nem sei como é que se deixou passar esta notícia que explica porque é que já há tanto tempo só vemos "folclore transmontano" na televisão, nos jornais, na imprensa. Como já só vemos "folclore transmontano" pensamos que não há mundo, fora da visão que o senhor Nuno Cabral nos dá todos os dias. O potencial subversivo desta notícia é dizer-nos que isso se passa porque o senhor Nuno Cabral "comprou" o canal e que este transmite "apenas" "folclore transmontano", quando nos noticiários do dito "canal" se diz que se passa toda a música do mundo e se fala de forma plural sobre a vida fora de Montalegre. O Vasco Pulido Valente diz, e bem, que é difícil explicar a mediocridade aos medíocres, e eu acrescento que é igualmente difícil explicar a falta de ar a quem está habituado a respirar tóxicos. Usando o exemplo actual, é difícil dizer aos ouvintes do canal único, que estão "apenas" a ouvir "folclore transmontano" e que isso se deve ao facto de o senhor Nuno Cabral ter "comprado" o dito órgão de comunicação social. É por isso que, mais uma vez, sim mais uma vez e quantas forem precisas, eu vou falar da qualidade pouco sadia do ar da nossa democracia. Sim, falar da "asfixia democrática", aquela coisa de que este mesmo pensamento único não quer que se fale, por razões que se percebem demasiado bem. Decretou-se, ao estilo rebanho, que foi por isso que o PSD perdeu as eleições. Como sabem? Não sabem, é a olho e é conveniente quer para o PS (que assim pretende calar as críticas à "compra" do senhor Nuno Cabral) quer para os opositores de Manuela Ferreira Leite, que assim não só secundam o PS, como apontam para os seus inimigos internos, porque é suposto que tenha sido por recomendação minha e de Paulo Rangel que disso se falou na campanha. Cómodo, mas falso. Mas hoje, quando a "verdade" é um anátema ou um insulto, isso também não incomoda ninguém. E, ao fim de dez em onze comentadores e jornalistas na SICN ou na TSF ou na RTPN a dizerem o mesmo, quem é que se atreve a duvidar?Mas vamos ao "folclore transmontano", à música única que todos os canais transmitem. Há vários trechos desta música única, por exemplo, os relativos ao estado do mundo associados à completa ausência de espírito crítico sempre que o Presidente Obama está envolvido num assunto qualquer; os relativos à Europa e ao "europeísmo" apodíctico, insusceptível de discussão, a que só se pode dizer "sim" sob pena de envio para o Inferno do nacionalismo provinciano; e, por último, fico-me pela própria questão da "asfixia democrática" como exemplo nacional. Os dois primeiros mostram como em matérias tão decisivas se deixou de pensar, ou seja, de questionar se o "folclore transmontano" nos diz alguma coisa sobre o que se está a passar no Afeganistão, ou se o Tratado de Lisboa tem que ser acelerado não vão os conservadores ganhar as eleições no Reino Unido. Uma parte importante da "asfixia democrática" é a prevalência do pensamento único sobre Obama, a União Europeia, a crise e os seus fundamentos, o "neoliberalismo", etc., etc. Deixou de se poder pensar de fora do "folclore transmontano", e parece tão absurdo fazê-lo que a acusação soviética de loucura e de promessa de internamento já tem sido feita pelos mastins dos blogues "transmontanos". Para eles, Cavaco Silva é louco ou senil, Manuela Ferreira Leite, amavelmente tratada pela "velha", idem aspas, eu também não estou melhor, José Manuel Fernandes, Cintra Torres e mais meia dúzia que ainda escreve com independência nos blogues e nos jornais, estamos todos obviamente doentes porque não vemos nada de preclaro no "folclore transmontano". A questão da "asfixia democrática" começa exactamente aqui, nas pessoas que querem respirar com os dois pulmões e ainda distinguem o ar puro do dióxido de carbono, logo têm que ser mutantes loucos. É por isso que a questão da "asfixia democrática" é tão incómoda que suscita esta unanimidade para a calar. Exactamente porque existe, ela não pode sequer ser nomeada sem ruptura do véu que a encobre. Por isso, é das mais incómodas para o PS e para os próceres do pensamento único que nos pastoreiam do lado do poder. Primeiro, vamos ao termo e depois à coisa. O termo já se tornou um rodriguinho, mas a questão fia mais fino. A origem esteve num discurso de Paulo Rangel num 25 de Abril em que falou de "claustrofobia democrática", expressão que francamente prefiro à "asfixia", embora o que interessa é saber se a coisa existe e não se o nome é o melhor. O que é interessante lembrar é que o discurso de Rangel foi então muito positivamente saudado e, hoje, a mesma coisa, exactamente a mesma coisa, aparece como um atestado de derrota, apesar de Rangel ter falado nela na sua campanha vitoriosa nas eleições europeias. Pelos vistos, a "asfixia democrática" deu vitória nas europeias e derrota nas legislativas. Dizer que existem limitações à plena liberdade dos portugueses, em particular, de exprimirem as suas opiniões, sem sofrerem retaliações nos seus interesses, seja de manter o seu emprego ou de conseguirem a devida promoção, seja de não serem administrativamente punidos, seja de não verem os seus negócios ilegitimamente prejudicados, ou de serem às claras ou, acima de tudo, às escuras, perseguidos porque não gostam do Governo, do PS, da maçonaria, ou das "empresas do regime", como diz Henrique Neto, ou afastados dos órgãos de comunicação ou ostracizados, a favor de gente mais "útil" ao poder, mesmo quando, ou principalmente quando, são de "direita" - nomear tudo isto -, é proibido no regime do canal único do "folclore transmontano" . Seria interessante perguntar o que é que mudou para melhor, desde que Rangel fez o seu discurso, na "claustrofobia democrática"? Mudou, só que para pior. Os dois órgãos de comunicação que o primeiro-ministro atacou publicamente estão abatidos. O Jornal Nacional da TVI encerrou como espaço crítico do Governo, e o PÚBLICO está sujeito a uma campanha para mudar a sua linha editorial e o seu director. Somaram-se os assuntos tabu, a começar pelas investigações que envolvem o primeiro-ministro, como o caso Freeport e outros, em que ninguém se interroga como é que uma imprensa livre aceita tão grande condicionamento ao ponto de tornar "excessivo" quem tem coragem de falar. Fosse no Reino Unido ou nos EUA e veriam se era assim. É também porque há um coro de "folclore transmontano" que ninguém se incomoda em perguntar porque razão é que Portugal baixou de 16º para 30º no índice de liberdade de imprensa. Pelos vistos os Repórteres Sem Fronteiras acham que sempre há "asfixia democrática". Por cá, tudo a assobiar para o lado.Mas nem sequer é o que se vê o que é o mais importante. O mais importante é o que não se vê, porque a patrulha dos dissidentes do "folclore transmontano" é feita em todos os azimutes, desde os blogues que fazem o dirty job, a começar pelos pagos pelo Governo, a acabar em operações políticas de monta como foi a doDiário de Notícias contra Cavaco Silva e o PSD. Gente cujo único pecado é não alinhar no coro do "folclore transmontano" é imediatamente sujeita a uma campanha de insultos. É, por exemplo, o caso de Paulo Tunhas, filósofo e co-autor de um notável livro com Fernando Gil, também cuidadosamente esquecido pela sua ruptura com o cânone, que cometeu o crime de "perceber", no melhor sentido, Manuela Ferreira Leite, um acto proibido no coro do "folclore transmontano", cantado "à esquerda" pelos amigos de José Sócrates e "à direita" pelos de Passos Coelho. Estes exemplos vêm de uma pequena minoria das elites, e têm esse defeito, mas também têm uma vantagem. A vantagem é que estão em posição de perceber e falar do que se está a passar porque têm melhor condição económica, logo mais defesas. Mas seria profundamente errado pensarmos que é aqui que a "claustrofobia democrática" é mais grave. É no homem comum, que tem medo de perder o emprego, no pequeno empresário que teme perder uma encomenda porque refilou com as dívidas do Estado ou o fisco ou a ASAE, no funcionário público que sabe que tem que agradar ao chefe do PS, no jornalista que questiona opack journalisme é logo afastado da "política" por se suspeitar que "está feito com o PSD". É no homem que tem o direito de viver num país livre, com uma comunicação social crítica, com uma informação equilibrada, e nem sequer se pode aperceber até que ponto está a ser, todos os dias, manipulado com "folclore transmontano".



Historiador

terça-feira, 27 de outubro de 2009

Um artigo interessante sobre um livro ainda mais interessante.


Reason for Faith



The two ideals need not be rivals.

by Ryan T. Anderson 10/19/2009, Volume 015, Issue 05 (in http://www.weeklystandard.com/)




"Galileo Goes to Jail"


And Other Myths about Science and Religion


Edited by Ronald L. Numbers


Harvard



The past few years have brought a revival of a largely 19th-century phenomenon: the attempt to deploy science to discredit religion. We've seen Richard Dawkins use evolutionary biology to explain away our God Delusion while Victor Stenger co-opted physics to explain that God is The Failed Hypothesis and Science Shows That God Does Not Exist. Daniel Dennett went to work Breaking the Spell to show Religion as a Natural [not supernatural] Phenomenon, while Sam Harris wrote A Letter to a Christian Nation noting The End of Faith. We've been warned about The Theocons and the Christianists, today's theocrats attempting to set up an American Theocracy.
The story is always the same: a battle between irrational faith and rational science, in which the latter defeats the former. Of course, the real force behind these books is politics, especially where it intersects with morality. The new atheists aren't really concerned about baptisms or bar mitzvahs; they simply deplore the moral, political, and cultural values advanced by traditional Jews and Christians, and readily denounce all religious believers in an effort to discredit them. And of course, science is manipulated as the weapon of choice.
None of this is new, really. As the editor of this volume, Ronald Numbers, points out, "the greatest myth in the history of science and religion holds that they have been in a state of constant conflict." Numbers knows this territory well; he's a distinguished scholar who has served as president of both the History of Science Society and the American Society of Church History. He points readers to 19th-century polemics--such as John William Draper's History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew D. White's A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896)--to explain how most Americans came to believe so many tall tales about the history of science and religion. Of these myths, the collection of essays in Galileo Goes to Jail aims to debunk 25 of the most prominent.
Though it is written by academics from Harvard, Oxford, Johns Hopkins, Chicago, and the like, the book is intended for nonspecialists. In about 10 pages per myth, the contributors explain the myth's content, how so many people have come to believe it, and what the historical evidence shows to the contrary. The authors necessarily spend the bulk of their time debunking attacks on religion in the name of science, but they also clear the muddy waters left behind when pro-religion forces try to obscure the scientific record.
So, for example, readers discover that Galileo never really was imprisoned (nor was he tortured), that Giordano Bruno was not a martyr on behalf of science (though he was persecuted for his heretical theological views as a defrocked monk who denied the doctrine of the Trinity), that "every important medieval thinker" rejected the flat-earth theory and held fast to a spherical-earth theory, and that "no evidence supports the notion" that Christianity opposed the use of anesthesia in childbirth.
Likewise, claims that the evidence for organic evolution rests on circular reasoning, that Darwin was complicit in Nazi biology, and that "Intelligent Design" mounts a scientific challenge to evolution are all thoroughly explored and roundly rejected.
We also learn that neither the atheists nor the evangelicals are right on Darwin: Evolution didn't lead him to reject Christianity (the untimely deaths of his father and daughter, coupled with the doctrine of eternal damnation, did), nor did he undergo a deathbed conversion. Likewise, despite attempts to list Einstein in the "pro-God" column, he didn't believe in a personal god or favor any traditional organized religion (his many statements on religion showing him to be more of a Spinozist). And regardless of what Inherit the Wind might have us believe about the Scopes "monkey trial," William Jennings Bryan triumphed on the stand and was widely hailed as a hero upon his death shortly thereafter.
In the grand scheme of things, some of these myths are rather unimportant, but it is always useful to get the historical record clear. Among the more interesting myths, though, are those involving Copernicus, Descartes, and Newton. In the popular telling of the tale, Copernicus knocked humanity off its pedestal at the center of the universe, Descartes invented the "ghost in the machine," and Newton's mechanistic cosmology eliminated any role for God. The popular tales are wrong on all three counts.
While the birth of heliocentrism certainly changed man's understanding of his place in the cosmos, it did so by "simultaneously [enhancing] the cosmic status of both earth and sun." The problem is that we read into the historical record assumptions that simply didn't exist back then; namely, that the center is somehow a privileged position. But the Jewish philosopher Maimonides argued that "in the case of the Universe .  .  . the nearer the parts are to the center, the greater is their turbidness, their solidity, their inertness, their dimness, and darkness." And the Roman Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas agreed that precisely because earth lay (as he thought) at the center, it was "the most material and coarsest (ignobilissima) of all bodies." In other words, the center was no privileged position.
But even if Copernicus had demoted the earth--notably, this spin wasn't proposed until a hundred years after his death--it wouldn't have been a problem for anyone who declared with the Psalmist, "When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars which you have established; what is man that you are mindful of him?"
Just as antireligion polemicists thought the demotion of the earth would be a fatal blow to traditional faith, so too did they think that attacking the ghost in the machine would do away with conceptions of the soul. The problem here is that Descartes explicitly rejected this image of how he thought the immaterial mind related to the material body, "asserting that mind and body are 'intermingled' so as to form a 'unitary whole.' "
Furthermore, traditional Christianity never took the dim view of the body that the polemicists, in rejecting Descartes's putative views, assumed it did. The strong Christian accent on our identity as embodied beings who hope in the resurrection of the body seems to have escaped them. Equally baffling are claims that Newton was a Deist who set up the Clockmaker God, for this conception of Newton "is more than just badly mistaken: it is precisely the opposite of the truth. It cannot simply be corrected; it must be utterly repudiated."
While Newton promoted a mechanistic physics, he held that "God governed the world actively and constantly." Newton explained this governance by appeals to alchemy--a part of his intellectual legacy (along with his lengthy biblical and theological treatises) that is constantly overlooked by popularizers of science history.
When one steps back to consider all the myths together, one notices a thread running through about half of them: the role that religion played, for better or worse, in developing the life of the mind and fostering scientific practice.
On the one hand, antireligion proponents argue that the birth of Christianity did away with ancient science, that medieval Christianity explicitly suppressed the beginnings of science, that Islamic culture was inhospitable to the scientific mindset, and that at the dawn of modernity, Catholics contributed nothing to the scientific enterprise.
On the other hand, some argue that Christianity alone--with its emphasis on God as Logos and the rational structure of creation--actually gave rise to science: Why is it, they ask, that across time and space, science only fully developed in one culture?
As both sets of myths are debunked, there emerges a rich tableau of the characters and scenes that helped produce modern science: the ancient Greek predecessors; the Islamic reception, development, and transmission of Greek thought; the Christian emphasis on the unity of truth in God and thus on investigation into the book of God's word (the Bible) and the book of God's work (nature); and the financial support of the institutional church, which founded the modern university. While Christianity wasn't the only factor that gave rise to modern science, it was certainly no hindrance. As one scholar put it, "The Roman Catholic Church gave more financial and social support to the study of astronomy for over six centuries, from the recovery of ancient learning during the late Middle Ages into the Enlightenment, than any other, and probably all other, institutions."
A book advancing such claims could easily have devolved into a slipshod production by pro-religion apologists. But Galileo Goes to Jail is nothing of the sort. Published by Harvard, it is rigorously researched and well footnoted, and written by 25 of the leading historians in the English-speaking world. And as Numbers points out in his introduction, fewer than half of the contributors are religious believers at all; and of those, there are only two evangelicals, one Catholic, and one Jew. In other words, they have no axe to grind, and their only agenda is to set the historical record straight.
Given all of the polemics published today, this is a breath of fresh air. Its organizers at the Templeton Foundation should consider producing a companion volume that focuses on more current debates, particularly on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, and their intersection. It could bring together scientists, philosophers, and theologians to examine their respective disciplines' limits and potential areas of overlap.
It could remind us that natural science can reveal how the physical world works but not how we should act in it or what might exist above and beyond it; that, while physics is important, it is silent about metaphysics; and that those who look to the Bible for details on biology or cosmology had better look elsewhere.
Ryan T. Anderson is editor of Public Discourse: Ethics, Law, and the Common Good.

segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2009

Conferência "Empreendedorismo e poder local" (e outros pontos)

Após a interrupção estival, recuperamos a nossa actividade para fazer um breve resumo da última conferência, sobre “Empreendorismo e poder local”, e para anunciar que o modelo de funcionamento da Ala se manterá ao nível da organização de conferências, complementado, simultaneamente, com participações mais regulares no blog, desejo expresso desde a sua criação, mas que não foi levado a cabo de imediato devido à sobrecarga profissional dos seus membros.

Continuamos a contar com a participação activa de todos os que nos têm acompanhado: seja nas intervenções nas conferências, seja através de sugestões dirigidas à Ala Nun’Álvares!

I. Conferência da Ala Nun'Álvares sobre Empreendorismo e Poder Local - "O que oferecem aos portugueses as cidades do interior do país?"

Como oradores convidados estiveram os presidentes das Câmaras Municipais de Penela e de Moura.

O autarca de Moura, Dr. José Maria Pós-de-Mina, apresentou os principais eixos de desenvolvimento do vasto município alentejano. A fixação da população através da criação de trabalho, associada aos novos projectos energéticos, tem sido um dos principais objectivos perseguidos por este executivo na sua gestão. É um município bastante importante devido à sua reserva cinegética e à produção de azeite. Foi muito beneficiado, recentemente, com a barragem do Alqueva.

O Eng. Paulo Júlio, presidente da Câmara Municipal de Penela, resumiu também na sua apresentação as várias acções que o Município tem desenvolvido no último mandato. Para se afirmar no seu entorno, pretende ser uma alternativa de residência aos trabalhadores de Coimbra, através da oferta de habitação a custo controlado e inserida num ambiente natural muito agradável. Ao nível económico, pretende atrair novas indústrias e serviços. Foi criado um polo específico para fixar empresas start-up na localidade. O Fórum de Desenvolvimento Económico, levado a cabo em parceria com a Universidade de Coimbra, a recuperação de aldeias históricas e a criação de percursos de desporto e lazer têm sido algumas das marcas deste mandato extremamente dinâmico, que não se deixa limitar pela extensão do concelho.

II. O Blog da Ala servirá para os seus membros partilharem com o público habitual das conferências algumas ideias sobre temas actuais da sociedade, na matriz política, económica e social.

Informamos também que pretendemos retomar as conferências após as eleições autárquicas, dada a mobilização a que até lá estão sujeitos alguns dos potênciais conferencistas.

III . Alteramos o nome do mail de contacto da Ala, que passa a ser: BLOGALANUNALVARES@GMAIL.COM.

Ficamos a aguardar os vossos contactos e sugestões.

A Ala.